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Abstract—JavaScript (JS) engines are virtual machines that
execute JavaScript code. These engines find frequent application
in web browsers like Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, Microsoft
Internet Explorer and Apple Safari. Since, the purpose of a
JS engine is to produce executable code, it cannot be run
in a non-executable environment, and is susceptible to attacks
like Just-in-Time (JIT) Spraying, which embed return-oriented
programming (ROP) gadgets in arithmetic or logical instructions
as immediate offsets. This paper introduces libmask, a JIT
compiler extension to prevent the JIT-spraying attacks as an
effective alternative to XOR based constant blinding. libmask
transforms constants into global variables and marks the memory
area for these global variables as read only. Hence, any constant
is referred to by a memory address making exploitation of
arithmetic and logical instructions more difficult. Further, these
memory addresses are randomized to further harden the security.
The scheme has been implemented and evaluated as a librddy
extension to Google V8 scripting engine with optimizations that
contain performance overhead and make libmask a feasible
approach. We demonstrate that libmask masks all the constants
in JITed code, and effectively raise the bar for JIT-spray and JIT-
ROP attacks. The average overhead incurred upon memory is
less than 300 kilobytes, while in most benchmarks the memory
overhead is less than 10 KB. The average performance overhead
observed with optimizations measures is 5.31%. Further, this
new approach shows a modest performance improvement over
currently deployed constant blinding technique in Google V8.
I. INTRODUCTION
At the heart of web browsers lie JavaScript engines -
virtual machines that execute the JavaScript code. Some of
the popular JavaScript engines are: Google V8 (in Google
Chrome)[30], SpiderMonkey (in Mozilla Firefox)[31], Chakra
(in Microsoft IE and Edge)[32], JavaScriptCore (in Ap-
ple Safari)[33], and Mozilla’s Rhino (completely written in
Java)[34]. With such proliferation of web browsers in the
market, it becomes equally important to harden them against
security vulnerabilities and exploits. Attackers often abuse
vulnerabilities and bugs to conduct a successful exploit on the
system or application. In response to these exploits, multiple
defense mechanisms have been proposed and deployed in
modern browsers. Data Execution Prevention (DEP)[4] is
widely deployed across browsers and systems. DEP is a tech-
nique that prevents input data (from the attacker) from being
executed, thus preventing payload injection attacks. However,
Shacham et al. [18] showed that DEP can be bypassed, using
a technique called Return-Oriented Programming (ROP)[18].
ROP is an effective code-reuse attack that exploits a set of
Turing-complete code snippets called ROP gadgets in the
program and chain them together to deploy an attack.
JIT-spraying attacks allow an attacker to bypass data exe-
cution prevention (DEP) and memory randomization (ASLR).
For this, the attacker embeds a ROP gadget as an immediate
offset in XOR instructions. Subsequently, the attacker forces
the JIT-compiler to emit many of these malicious instructions
so that the attacker’s chance of guessing the location of one
of those instructions is high.
This paper introduces libmask, a non-XORing constant
blinding scheme, to prevent the so-called JIT-spraying attacks.
These attacks embed ROP gadgets in arithmetic and/or logical
instructions as immediate offsets. The motivation behind this
scheme is to reduce the performance overhead and increase se-
curity of the currently deployed XOR based constant blinding.
For example, in case of Google V8, only integer constant of
size greater than 4 bytes are blinded. A constant is first XORed
with a random key to generate the obfuscated constant. The
constants is XORed back again when the original constant
needs to be used. Athanasakis et al. in [17] has shown that
XOR constant blinding technique can be bypassed. Their
technique contains constants, which are less than 4 bytes and
hence, are emitted as such in the JIT code. To mitigate this
issue, we replace a constant with a randomized address.
The fundamental idea is to replace each constant with a
random address. This random address stores the value of
the constant. This is achieved by replacing constants with a
global variable in the source code. All constants within the
source code are allocated at random addresses by random
shuffling and adding random padding. The memory area of
these random addresses is then marked as read-only. We then
present several optimizations to improve the performance.
These optimizations includes Register Allocation and Constant
Caching to improve the performance of constant masked
code and masking constants in parallel to decrease the JIT
compilation overhead.
We evaluated libmask against XOR based constant blind-
ing in Google V8 and discovered that libmask performs
better than XOR based constant blinding both in terms of
2security and performance.
a) Contributions: This paper makes the following con-
tributions:
• We introduce the design of libmask, a JIT Compiler
extension as an alternative to XOR based constant blind-
ing (Section III).
• We present various optimizations for libmask to im-
prove the performance of JIT code and reduce JIT com-
piler overhead (Section IV).
• We plugged in libmask into Google V8 and performed
extensive evaluations on Octane Benchmarks [16] (Sec-
tion V). Our evaluations show that:
– The average performance overhead of libmask is
5.31%.
– The average memory requirement of libmask is
less than 300 KB, while a number of benchmarks
show an average requirement of just 10 KB.
– libmask performs better than XOR based constant
blinding extensively deployed in modern browsers
like Google Chrome.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Just-In-Time Compiler
A Just-in-time (JIT) compiler generates native code during
the execution of the program. JIT compilation combines
two traditional approaches: ahead of time compilation and
interpretation. JIT compilers emit native code during program
run-time. Like interpreters, they translate bytecode to machine
code continuously but employ caching of translated code to
avoid re-translating the previously translated code. Several
modern run-time environments employ JIT compilation tech-
niques like most implementations of Java, Microsoft .NET
Framework, or Google’s V8 Javascript Engine.
However, the JITed code is predictable in nature. In actual
practice, extremely minimal variations are introduced in the
JITed code: the JIT compiler always emits out the same native
code for a certain piece of source code. This predictability
nature puts its security under question since adversaries can
predict the native code with accuracy.
B. ROP and JIT Spray
Return-oriented programming is a non code-injection attack
technique. It differs from the classical return-to-libc[18] in
the way that it utilizes small instruction sequences (ending
with ret instruction) present in either the binary or libraries
linked to the application. These instruction sequences are
called gadgets. The following example illustrates how ROP
attack works.
Consider loading a constant into a register, which will allow
to save the value in the stack, and enabling it to be popped
when required. The following instruction would pop the value
from the stack into the EAX register and return the address on
the stack’s top, which can be the address to the next gadget.
1 pop eax;
2 ret;
pop eax; ret;
0x00dead;
next gadget’s address;
Fig. 1. Stack representation of the gadget
Fig. 2. Intended Gadget - Loading a constant in a register and popping it
when required.
The stack diagram in Figure 1 explains how the above gadget
helps to return to the next gadget, which further can be chained
to perform a successful exploit.
JIT Spray[5], a form of ROP attack exploits a JIT Com-
piler’s behavior and bypasses Address Space Layout Ran-
domization [18] and DEP [4]. As mentioned earlier, JIT
compilers are predictable in the way that the JITed code
shows minimal variations across multiple compilations. Also,
a JIT compiler generates executable code, and hence it must
run in an executable environment. Therefore, a JIT compiler
is usually exempt from DEP. A JIT Spray attack works
by performing heap spraying[36] with the generated native
code that facilitates arbitrary code execution. In case of web
browsers, heap spraying makes use of the JavaScript code and
spray the heap by creating large strings, followed by making
copies of the long string with a shellcode. These copies are
stored in an array, till the point where sufficient memory has
been sprayed. This ensures that the exploit would work.
C. Constant Blinding/Masking
There are two ways a constant in the source code could
land up in the executable code: (i) as a value stored by the
compiler close to the code (without executing it as code), or
(ii) as an immediate instruction operand.
For the first case, it suffices to add padding, e.g. NOP in-
sertion, randomizing the address location of the value, making
it hard to guess for the adversaries. For the later case, one of
the currently deployed defenses in modern browsers effective
against JIT Spray attacks is constant blinding. This involves a
generated random key (or cookie) used to XOR an immediate
operand, and then XORed again when it is actually used. For
instance, assume the following sample JavaScript code:
1 var a = 0x9058C3
The native code (without any constant blinding mechanism)
would include the constant as it is. Note that this constant can
potentially be exploited since, it can act as an intended gadget.
Figure 2 shows that the combination of 58 and c3 can act
as gadget, which can pop a value as and when required from
the stack. To prevent this to happen, modern web browsers
deploy constant blinding, wherein the constant is XORed with
a random key (called cookie) and XORed again when the
constant needs to be used. This way, the constant never ends
up as it is in the JIT buffer, raising the bar for the adversary
3Fig. 3. Design and working of libmask
to predict the value without knowing the cookie’s value. The
variable a is never showed up as 0x9058c3, but as 0x826c95
with cookie’s value used being 0x123456. Now, when variable
b wants to use the original value of variable a, a is XORed
again with the same cookie in its operation.
1 a = 0x9058c3 ˆ 0x123456 // = 826c95
2 ...
3 b = a ˆ 0x123456
The machine code generated to implement constant blinding
for above example is given below:
1 mov rax, 0x826c95 //move XORed constant to
register
2 xor rax, 0x123456 //xor with cookie
As can be observed from above, it becomes hard to guess
the original constant’s value, since that is never showed up
in the native code as it is. However, there are two operations
required to obfuscate and use the value of the constant. The
current scheme takes care of integer constants of size more
than 4 bytes only (e.g. in Google V8). Gadgets can be formed
from integers of less than 4 bytes also [17].
III. DESIGN
libmask performs constant masking in the code generated
by a JIT compiler. It reads the code emitted by JIT compiler,
disassembles it, performs constant masking, assembles the
constant-masked code (CMC), and returns the CMC to the
JIT compiler. This CMC is then executed by the virtual
machine. Figure 3 shows the design and working of libmask.
Currently, libmask supports x86-64 architecture, and hence
our discussion will stick around with x86-64 architecture in
this paper.
Constant masking via libmask is divided into three
phases: (i) Constant Determination, (ii) Constant Memory
Allocation, and (iii) Constant Replacement. Constant Determi-
nation phase determines all the constants in the machine code.
Constant Memory Allocation allocates the memory for the
constants (constant memory) and marks it as read-only after
shuffling and padding. Constant Replacement phase replaces
each constant found in the machine code with it’s respective
address in constant memory.
A. Constant Determination
After disassembling the code generated by JIT compiler, this
phase traverses each machine instruction inside the code. If
any one of the operands to a machine instruction is a constant,
then the constant and the position of the machine instruction
are recorded.
B. Constant Memory Allocation
After traversing the machine code, the set of all constants is
shuffled. Further, random padding is added after each constant.
This ensures that the constants are allocated at randomized
addresses. After allocating memory, the storage slot corre-
sponding to each constant is initialized with the value of the
constant. Finally, this constant memory (memory holding up
the constants) area is marked as read-only.
Algorithm 1 Constant Memory Allocation Algorithm
1: random shuffle (constantVector)
2: posArray ← new int [constantVector.length()+1]
3: posArray[1] ← 0
4: for all i = 2 → constantVector.length()+1 do
5: posArray[i] = posArray[i − 1] + sizeof (constantVec-
tor[i − 1])
6: for all i = 1 → constantVector.length()+1 do
7: j ← (rand() % 2) × m
8: for all k = i → constantVector.length()+1 do
9: posArray[k] ← posArray[k] + j
10: fix alignment for each constant in posArray
11: memorySize ← posArray[constantVector.length () + 1]
12: constantMemory ← malloc (memorySize)
13: for all i = 1 → constantVector.length () do
14: memcpy (constantMemory, posArray[i],
possArray[i+1]-1, constantVector[i])
15: mark constant memory as read-only
Algorithm 1 presents constant memory allocation algorithm.
It takes two arguments: (i) constantVector, which is
a vector of constants as an argument and (ii) m, which
is the length of each padding. Line 1 randomly shuffles
constantVector. Line 2 creates posArray, which con-
tains the position (in bytes) in constant memory for each
constant. Lines 3 - 5 set the initial position for each constant
based on the size of the previous constant in the array. Lines 6 -
9 add a random padding of atmost m bytes after every constant.
Line 10 adds the required alignment for every constant and
updates the posArray. Lines 10 - 11 allocate the constant
memory, initialize the memory locations with the constant, and
mark the constant memory as read-only.
C. Constant Replacement
After Constant Memory Generation phase, Constant Re-
placement will replace constant in machine instruction with
its address in the constant memory. In x86-64 architecture,
one of the operand in instructions can also be an address. For
example, the add instruction, can take a constant, register, or a
memory location as one of its operand. This memory location
will be first de-referenced by the CPU to obtain the operand
value. This phase rewrites the instruction in the machine code
with the address of constant in constant memory.
D. Example
In this section, we present an example of the working of
our technique. For this example we assume an x86 32-bit
4Fig. 4. Example
architecture for simplicity and understanding. Figure 4 shows
an example of constant masking using libmask in the source
code. The source code contains five constants. These constants
are the gadgets required for calling mprotect [17]. The
JITed contains these constants, and hence these constants can
be exposed by an attacker. On the other hand, the constant
masked code generated by libmask replaces these constants
with random addresses. These random addresses are accessed
by the CPU to obtain the constant. The random addresses are
different for every execution of the source program.
IV. OPTIMIZATIONS
libmask presented in Section III could result in high
performance overhead as given in Section V. This performance
overhead is due to the following reasons:
1) Low performance of CMC: An immediate value in the
original machine code is replaced by an address to
produce the CMC. Since, a memory access is a costly
operation compared to using an immediate operand,
CMC suffers from this bottleneck.
2) Time taken in diversification of code: The whole pro-
cess of diversification takes time proportional to the
number of constants to be blinded. In Section V,
MandreelLatency benchmark suffers the highest
performance overhead. MandreelLatency bench-
marks measures the JIT compiler latency.
To decrease the performance overhead due to the above
mentioned issues, the following optimizations are performed.
A. Parallel Division of the Machine Code
Optimizations presented in Section IV-B and Section IV-C
require the JITed code to be divided into loop-free subse-
quences. A loop-free subsequence is defined as a machine
code instruction sequence, which does not contain a loop
i.e. a loop-free subsequence does not contain a backward
branch. Every backward branch divides the code into two
loop-free subsequences: (i) one between the previous loop-
free subsequence and the target of the backward branch, (ii)
and the other between the target of the backward branch and
the backward branch itself.
In this section, we present a parallel algorithm for dividing
a machine code into loop-free subsequences. To divide the
machine code into loop-free subsequences in parallel, different
threads are created at first. The number of threads is set to
be equal to the number of CPU cores. The machine code is
then divided equally to each of the threads. Each thread then
examines each instruction individually. If an instruction is a
backward branch, then the target of the backward branch is
recorded into the thread’s local database. Finally, each thread’s
local database is merged serially to the main thread database.
B. Register Allocation
Main Memory access is a costly operation as compared to
access from register or using immediate operands. Access-
ing same memory address more than once is costlier than
accessing the memory address once, storing the value in a
register, and accessing that register when required. Therefore,
we developed our Register Allocation optimization
algorithm to decrease the memory access overhead.
Initially, the constant masked code is divided into loop-
free subsequences as given in Section IV-A. In a loop-free
subsequence, for each register r all parts of a loop-free
subsequence between each access of r is determined. Let us
call each of these parts of a loop-free subsequence as access
range for a register r. Hence, in each of the access range of
register r, there are no accesses to the r i.e. for each instruction
in access range of r, r is neither used as a source operand
or a destination operand. In each of the access range for a
register r, the occurrence of each constant memory address as
an operand to any instruction is counted. In an access range
of register r, for a constant memory address with maximum
number of accesses, push r and mov r, [<constant
memory address>] instructions are inserted before the
first instruction of access range for r, each occurrence of
the constant memory address is replaced by r, and pop r
instruction is inserted after the last instruction of address range
of r. This process is then done for all access range of all
registers. Note that push, pop, and mov instructions do not
change the flag register.
If the access range for a register r is the loop, then above
technique also has the advantage of bringing the push and
mov instructions outside of the loop.
C. Constant Caching
Since, constants have to be loaded from the constants
memory, the CPU can take advantage of the memory locality.
To improve the locality provided by the technique in Section
III, we develop Constant Caching optimization.
In a loop-free subsequence, if one constant is accessed then
the CPU can take the advantage of the memory locality, to
also load other constants of a loop-free subsequence in the
cache. To acheive this, instead of shuffling all constants in
the constant un-masked code, Constant Caching optimization
5first shuffles the constants of a loop-free subsequence and then
shuffles each group of constants of a loop-free subsequence.
Alogrithm 2 represents the Constant Caching Algorithm.
Lines 1 - 2 shuffle constants for each loop-free subsequence.
Line 3 shuffles each loop-free subsequence. To add Constant
Caching in our technique, Line 1 of Algorithm 1 is replaced
by Alogrithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Constant Caching Algorithm
1: for all seq ∈ loopfreeSubSequences do
2: random shuffle (constantVector, seq.start, seq.end)
3: random shuffle subsequence (constantVector)
D. Parallel Constant Determination
The Constant Determination phase given in III-A is serial.
Hence, Constant Determination phase would perform poorly
on benchmarks with huge number of constants. To solve
this issue, we developed Parallel Constant Determination
optimization. In this optimization, the disassembled code
generated by the JIT compiler is divided equally to different
threads. The number of threads is set equal to the number
of CPU cores. Each thread then examines each instruction. If
the operand to any instruction is a constant, it is recorded in
a threads local database. Each thread’s local database is then
merged serially to the main thread database.
V. EVALUATION
In this section, we provide our implementation of
libmask, evaluation techniques, environment, and results.
Our evaluation is based on the performance, memory require-
ment, and security impact.
A. Implementation
Google Chrome occupies over 60% [15] of the market
share of web browsers. Hence, it was imperative to implement
and evaluate our technique on Google V8. Like most virtual
machines, Google V8 has a Garbage Collector and a Just-
In-Time compiler. However, V8 does not use any byte code
representation. Instead, it directly converts JavaScript code to
machine code.
B. Environment
We evaluated our implementation on a 4 core 2.30 GHz Intel
Core i7-3610QM machine with 6 GB of RAM running Fedora
21 with Linux Kernel version 3.19 and executing Octane 2.0
JavaScript Benchmarks [16].
C. Performance Evaluation
We performed performance evaluation on different config-
urations. In each of these configurations, we fixed m = 8,
which is the length of each padding in Algorithm 1. The
configurations are:
• V8 configuration is Google V8 without libmask and
XOR based constant blinding disabled.
• libmask configuration is Google V8 with libmask
presented in Section III without any optimization.
• libmask+O configuration is Google V8 integrated with
libmask with all optimizations enabled.
• XOR is Google V8 with XOR based constant blinding
enabled. Google V8 implements a XOR based Constant
Blinding by XORing an integer of size more than 4 bytes
with a random key and then XORing it again when it is
actually used.
• libmask+O+4b configuration is Google V8 integrated
with libmask with all optimizations enabled but only
constants of greater than 4 bytes are masked. This con-
figuration is used to compare with XOR configuration.
Each benchmark was executed five times for each of the
configurations and average time was calculated. Figure 5
shows the performance overhead for libmask over V8,
libmask+O over V8, and XOR over libmask+O+4b. Ob-
serve that with the optimizations enabled the overhead of
libmask has significantly decreased. MandreelLatency
benchmark, which measures compiler latency shows signifi-
cant performance overhead of 50.75% with libmask con-
figuration. This is because Mandreel benchmark consists of
over 19,000 integer constants and blinding all of them incurs
noticeable overhead. However, with optimizations enabled
libmask, this overhead reduces to 19% because the constants
are now being masked in parallel. In Mandreel benchmark
which shows the highest overhead, there are large number
of constants in the functions with high amount of hotness.
On the other hand, for the benchmarks with low overhead
like Richards the number of constants in the functions
with high amount of hotness are very less. The average
performance overhead observed with optimizations enabled
is 5.31%. Figure 5 also shows that XOR configuration has
some performance overhead over libmask+O+4b. This per-
formance overhead can be attributed to the following reasons:
• XOR based constant blinding adds 2 instructions in
the machine code, while libmask+O+4b adds only 1
instruction.
• Memory addressing is a costly operation but with Con-
stant Caching and Register Allocation optimizations, in-
stead of memory access either register access or cache
access is used to obtain the constant.
• XOR based constant blinding does not implement tech-
niques to decrease the JIT compilation latency. With
libmask working over the source code in parallel, there
is a significant decrease in the overhead.
D. Memory Requirements
Table I shows the number of integer constants and size
of constant memory in KBs for each benchmark. The size
of constant memory is directly proportional to the number
of constants. Hence, Mandreel benchmark with 274842
constants requires 3 MB for constant memory and zlib with
lowest number of constant requires only 0.7 KB for constant
memory. On an average, the size of constant memory required
is only 295.7 KBs.
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Benchmark # of Integer
Constants
Constant Memory
Size (in KBs)
Richards 98 1.1
DeltaBlue 115 1.3
Crypto 800 9.6
RayTrace 176 2.1
EarleyBoyer 555 6.6
Splay 98 1.1
GameBoy 6211 74.5
CodeLoad 72 0.86
Mandreel 274842 3298.1
zlib 59 0.7
Typescript 4276 51.3
PdfJS 80446 965.3
RegExp 312 3.7
Navier-Stokes 199 2.3
Box2D 1475 17.7
Average 24648 295.7
TABLE I
NUMBER OF INTEGER CONSTANTS AND CONSTANT MEMORY SIZE (IN
KBS) FOR OCTANE BENCHMARKS
E. Security Evaluation
We performed security evaluation of libmask using two
approaches: (i) security analysis and (ii) implementing real
world attacks.
1) Security Analysis: The security provided by libmask
is based on the fact that constants appearing in the source code
are replaced by random memory addresses. Hence, the attacker
is not able to exploit the original constants any longer, since,
they completely get masked under randomized addresses and
are not available in the JITed code. Moreover, in each run of
the program the constants are masked to different addresses,
i.e. no constant gets the same memory address across different
runs of the program, thereby significantly reducing any chance
for attacker to guess the memory address. Since, these are
random addresses, it is highly improbable that the attacker
could get a useful gadget.
Assuming there are n constants in the source program, there
are n! ways to arrange constants in the constant memory and
there are 2n different ways to add padding in the constant
memory. Hence, for n constants there are 2n × n! different
addresses. Table II depicts the number of possible array
layouts for different values of n. With n = 32, there are
1.1 × 1045 possible memory addresses. For n = 16, there
are 1.3 × 1018 possible memory addresses. Therefore, the
probability of guessing the correct array layout is far too
low to consider to be feasible. For n = 16, the probability
is 7.7× 10−19.
We chose two attacks presented in [17] for evaluating
the security provided by libmask. One JavaScript attack is
shown in Figure 6. This attack contains 10 distinct constants,
hence there are 210 × 10! = 3715891200 possible addresses,
which can mask the constants. The second JavaScript attack
is shown in Figure 7. This attack contains 7 distinct constants,
hence, there are 27 × 7! = 645120 possible addresses, which
can mask the constants. We executed both these attacks on V8
with libmask and all the optimizations enabled. We found
that constants did not appear as such in the instructions, instead
they were masked by random addresses. We further found that
everytime we execute the attacks on V8 with libmask and
all the optimizations enabled, the disassembly of these random
addresses is different from what is required to produce the
attack. No gadget chaining could be then performed to allow
arbitrary code execution.
VI. RELATED WORK
A lot of work has been done to develop defenses against
code re-use attacks. One of the first ideas for raising the
bar of attack by randomization was presented in [1]. Several
ways of achieving this like substituting equivalent instructions,
instruction reordering, extra jump or call insertions and many
others were introduced by Cohen [1]. These ideas were further
enhanced in [2].
Code Randomization has been one of the most common
defense against code re-use attacks. Randomization techniques
for achieving code randomization includes instruction and
7Number of Constants (n) Cases for inserting padding (2n) Constant Arrangments (n!) Possible Memory Addresses (2n × n!)
2 22 2! 8
4 24 4! 384
8 28 8! 107
16 216 16! 1.3× 1018
32 232 32! 1.1× 1045
TABLE II
POSSIBLE CONSTANT MEMORY ADDRESSES FOR DIFFERENT NUMBER OF CONSTANTS
1 var g1 = 0;
2 ...
3 var g7 = 0;
4
5 for (var i = 0; i < 100000; i++)
6 {
7 g1 = 50011; // pop ebx; ret;
8 g2 = 50009; // pop ecx; ret;
9 g3 = 12828721; // xor eax, eax; ret;
10 g4 = 12811696; // mov 0x7d, al; ret;
11 g5 = 12833329; // xor edx, edx; ret;
12 g6 = 12781490; // mov 0x7, dl; ret;
13 g7 = 12812493; // int 0x80; ret;
14 }
Fig. 6. Attack 1
1 function r8(addr)
2 {
3 return addr + 0x5841;
4 }
5
6 function r9(addr)
7 {
8 return addr + 0x5941;
9 }
10
11 function emitgadgets ()
12 {
13 for (i = 0; i < 0xc35841; i++)
14 {
15 rax = 0xc358;
16 rcx = 0xc359;
17 rdx = 0xc35a;
18 r8 (0);
19 r9 (0);
20 }
21
22 return 0;
23 }
24
25 emitgadgets ();
Fig. 7. Attack 2
basic block reordering, register re-allocation, instruction sub-
stitution and NOP insertion. These techniques are implemented
by [3], [6], [7] in compiler. [9], [8] and [29] implements these
techniques in virtual machines and JIT. [10], [11] uses static
binary re-writing to implement above techniques. [8] applies
above techniques on dynamically generated code. These im-
plementations show that diversification has a positive impact
on software security with negligible performance overhead.
[8] relies on static NOP insertion techniques while [29] has
shown that even less performance overhead could be achieved
using dynamic adaptive NOP insertion.
One of the most common defenses to achieve constant
blinding is to XOR the constant with a randomly generated
key (cookie) and XOR the obtained value again with the key
whenever constants are used. We compared our approach with
this technique and found that our approach is significantly
better than this approach both in security and in performance.
The Chakra JS engine used in Internet Explorer as its JIT
engine employs several defenses like NOP insertion and XOR
based Constant Blinding. [17] has shown that even if JIT uses
the above approach as defense an attacker can still successfully
attack the system by generating some specific gadgets.
Song et al. showed in [12] that JIT buffers can be exploited
with the help of code injection techniques if the buffer is
both writable and executable or even temporarily writable
at times. A multi-threaded generated code is more prone
to above attack because the switch between writable and
executable leaves a time window for the application of exploit.
To avoid such exploits they also proposes a dynamic code
generation architecture which utilizes a separate process and
shared memory.
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) is an operat-
ing system level randomization technique. It places significant
areas of the program like stack and memory obtained from
mmap at random addresses. This technique is used by all major
operating systems (Windows, Linux and Mac OS). Although
this technique has several benefits it is not a sufficient security
measure against code reuse attacks. [18] has shown that ASLR
has very low entropy and it would take just a few minutes to
find the base address. DEP [4] and SafeSEH [28] are another
widely adopted lightweight protection mechanism. However,
like ASLR these too can be bypassed using techniques like
return-to-libc and ROP-based exploits.
Bubble [37] is an effective technique to mitigate heap
spraying wherein diversity is introduced at random locations
in the heap. Inserting special interrupting values in strings at
random locations in the heap at the time when a string is
stored in memory breaks the attackers’ assumption of memory
homogeneity, thereby preventing heap spraying attack.
JITDefender [13] is one way of improving JIT compiler
security. It hinders JIT spraying attacks by making all HLL
code pages as non-executable. These pages are changed to
executable by the compiler once the control enters in the
generated code and are changed back on return to the compiler
on runtime. This prevents an attacker from redirecting any
other branch to dynamically generated code. INSeRT [22] add
code randomization through a white box approach, requiring
manual changes in the code generation phase of compiler.
Control Flow Integrity was first proposed by Abadi et
al.[14]. This technique marks the valid targets of indirect
8control transfers (i.e. function entry points and landing points
for returns) with unique identifiers(IDs) and then inserts ID-
checks before each indirect call or return instruction. They
then identify the set of valid targets through a precise control
flow graph construction and enforcing control flow only to this
set for each indirect transfer instruction. This technique was
improved by Zhang et al in [23].
DynamoRIO [24], Valgrind [25], PIN [27] and Strata [26]
are binary rewriting tools. These tools are used for increasing
security, profiling, instrumentation and debugging.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this contribution, we presented libmask, a non-XOR
based Constant Masking technique for protecting browser JIT
engines against JIT spraying attacks that leverage constants.
libmask is capable of masking constants of all sizes, while
incurring a modest overhead over performance. libmask
replaces constant in the machine code with randomized ad-
dresses. We also presented several optimizations for decreasing
the performance overhead.
We integrated libmask with Google Chrome’s V8
JavaScript Engine. We evaluated the performance and security
impact of our technique by executing Octane Benchmarks and
compared it with existing mechanism, i.e. XOR based constant
blinding. We found that our approach masks all constants
in the JITed code and the average performance overhead we
obtained was 5.31%. We also found out, our approach not only
performs better than XOR based constant blinding but also has
better security impact than XOR based constant blinding.
As a part of our future work, we intend to further enhance
the performance of libmask and explore the possibility of
developing hybrid mechanisms presented in academia and
industries to harden security against JIT-ROP attacks.
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